What it means
When a browser connects, it agrees a session key with your server. With ECDHE key exchange, that key is thrown away after the connection, so nothing recorded today can be decrypted later. With plain RSA key exchange, the session key is protected only by the server's long-term private key. Our check offered only RSA key exchange ciphers, and your server accepted one.
Why it matters
If your server's private key is ever stolen or handed over, anyone who recorded past connections that used RSA key exchange can decrypt them. Modern browsers prefer ECDHE, so most visitors aren't affected, but an attacker can still choose the weaker option for their own connections, and compliance scans flag it.
How to fix it
- Find your server's cipher setting: in the web server, the load balancer or the CDN.
- Remove ciphers whose names start with
AESorRSAwithoutECDHEorDHEin front, or switch to a current recommended list that only includes ECDHE. - Reload the web server or save the setting.
nginx
Use a modern list, for example
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305;
then reload.
Apache
Set SSLCipherSuite to the same list and add SSLHonorCipherOrder off, then reload Apache.
Check it worked
Run the SSL check again. The table should read "Not offered" for RSA key exchange.