What a dangling record is
Hosted services such as website builders, help desks, storage buckets and app platforms let you use your own name. You add a CNAME record pointing your subdomain at the service, and the service serves your site on it. When you close the account or delete the site, the DNS record often stays behind. That leftover is a dangling record.
On many services, anyone can then create a new site and claim the name you no longer use. Your DNS keeps sending visitors to it, so the new owner serves their content on your subdomain: phishing pages that look like yours, or scripts that read cookies set for your domain. That is a subdomain takeover, and it needs no access to your accounts at all.
The same can happen with NS delegations to DNS hosting services, and with records that point at a domain nobody has registered.
How the check works
For each name we look up its address and alias records and follow the CNAME chain to its end. Then we compare every step against a catalog of hosted services and how each behaves when an account is gone.
- Target gone at the service: for services whose host names disappear with the account, a target that no longer exists means the name looks unclaimed.
- Service page: for services that answer every name with a recognizable page when they don't know it, we fetch the name once and look for that page.
- Unregistered domain: when the target or a nameserver belongs to a domain nobody has registered, anyone could register it.
- Broken delegation: when a name is delegated to nameservers that don't answer for it, and those nameservers belong to a DNS host where zones can be created by anyone, the zone looks claimable.
A name whose target answers normally is clear. A target that is broken but can't be claimed is reported with a low risk, so you can tidy it up.
Reading the result
Each name gets one row: its risk, where it points, the service it belongs to, and the evidence we found. Risk levels are:
- Looks claimable: the target looks unclaimed. Remove the record or claim the name again today.
- Could be claimable: claiming works on this service only in some setups. Check your account there.
- Broken, not claimable: the record leads nowhere, but nobody else can take it.
- No risk found: the target answers.
- Couldn't be checked: a lookup or the page fetch failed; run it again.
Each finding links to a step-by-step guide. In most cases the fix is to delete the record you no longer need.
Keeping it from happening again
Dangling records come from one habit: closing a service before removing the DNS records that point at it. Turn the order around. When a project ends, delete its DNS records first, then close the account. Keep a short list of which subdomains point at which outside services, and review it when people leave or vendors change. Running this check on that list every few months catches anything that slipped through, and it costs a credit per name. Many services also let you verify your whole domain in your account, which stops anyone else from claiming names under it.
Where the fingerprints come from
Our catalog of services is written in our own words and builds on public research by the security community, especially the can-i-take-over-xyz project, which documents how each service behaves. Every entry links to its source and the date we last checked it, and services change, so treat a result as a strong hint rather than proof.